

Shifting Paradigm of Modern Islam Fundamentalism as Islamized Space Autonomy in Indonesia

Eko Ariwidodo

Pamekasan State College for Islamic Studies
email: ekarwdd@gmail.com

Abstract

Idealism various groups of political Islam failed to change the political landscape of the Middle East and some other regions. Political Islam is not won power, while the old regimes are still in power. Western powers are increasingly plugging hegemony (political, economic, cultural) in the region. Political Islam is also not always successfully display the values contained in the ideals of fundamentalism in the form of the application of religious laws in politics. Islamic fundamentalists in some places only produce changes that are not significant in the fields of law, politics and economics. In this case, fundamentalism does emphasize the application of *Sharia* totally, but often do not care about the character of the political system. The variant of the traditional and modern fundamentalism fundamentalism can be seen also shift to the neo-fundamentalism. Orientation and strategy of neo-fundamentalism is the master of society through social action, far from being revolutionary, neo-fundamentalists are now entering into civil society and political classes.

Copyright (c) 2017 by Karsa. All Right Reserved
DOI: 10.19105/karsa.v25i1.1357

Although the character of the revolution is lost, the symbols of Islam seeped into the public and political discourse of Islam. Neo-fundamentalism seeks re-islamization society at grassroots level, and no longer through the country. Fundamentalists are directing the struggle in the birth of an Islamic society and Islamic space. This shift has seen as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism in the political failure that resulted in a significant change in the weight of thought and movement.

[Idealisme berbagai kelompok Islam politik ternyata gagal mengubah landscape politik Timur Tengah dan beberapa kawasan lainnya. Islam politik tidak berhasil meraih kekuasaan, sementara rezim-rezim lama masih terus berkuasa. Kekuatan Barat semakin menancapkan hegemoni (politik, ekonomi, budaya) di kawasan tersebut. Islam politik juga tidak selalu berhasil menampilkan nilai-nilai yang terkandung dalam cita-cita fundamentalisme berupa penerapan hukum-hukum agama (syariah) dalam politik. Kaum Islam fundamentalis di beberapa tempat hanya melahirkan perubahan-perubahan yang tidak signifikan di bidang hukum, politik dan ekonomi. Fundamentalisme memang menekankan penerapan syariah secara total, tetapi seringkali tidak mempedulikan watak sistem politik. Selain terdapat varian fundamentalisme tradisional dan fundamentalisme modern dapat disaksikan pula adanya pergeseran dengan apa yang disebut sebagai neo-fundamentalisme. Orientasi dan strategi kelompok neo-fundamentalisme yakni menguasai masyarakat melalui tindakan sosial. Jauh dari kesan revolusioner, kaum neo-fundamentalis sekarang masuk ke masyarakat sipil dan kelas-kelas politik. Meskipun watak revolusi hilang, simbol-simbol Islam merembes ke masyarakat dan diskursus politik Islam. Neo-fundamentalisme berusaha me-reislamisasi masyarakat pada tingkat akar-rumput, dan tidak lagi lewat negara.

Kaum fundamentalis tersebut mengarahkan perjuangannya pada lahirnya masyarakat Islam dan ruang Islami. Namun, pergeseran ini dipandang sebagai simbol kegagalan fundamentalisme Islam dalam politik yang berakibat pada terjadinya perubahan signifikan dalam bobot pemikiran dan gerakannya].

Keywords: shift paradigm, neo-fundamentalism, Islamized space

Introduction

Since the events of 11/9 until today, the term fundamentalism is quite hotly discussed in the media, not only at national level but also internationally. This happens as the outbreak of acts of terrorism that took shelter under the religion, especially Islam fundamentalism. So synonymous with the term fundamentalist “Islamic fundamentalism” or “Islamic fundamentalists” who have a negative impression and extremism.¹ If we examine more deeply rooted in religious fundamentalism is not only Islam but also other religions. Even the term fundamentalism that first appeared in the Western world by the American Protestant movement. They fight against secular society both good and bad, isolated from social life and hostile minds of scientific findings.²

¹ See “Religion Library Islamic Fundamentalism”, accessed November 13th, 2016, <http://www.patheos.com/library/islamic-fundamentalism>; or see <http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H007.htm>, accessed November 13th, 2016; Ali Mamouri, “The Roots of Radicalism in Political Islam”, accessed November 14th, 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/radicalism-political-islam-roots-sunni-shiite-fundamentalist.html>.

² See Phil Zuckerman, ““Secularism, Religion, and Racism: Who is more likely to be racist, the strongly religious or the strongly secular?”, accessed November 17th, 2016, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-secular-life/201408/secularism-religion-and-racism>;

Meanwhile the Arabic term fundamentalism is not known, but researchers Southwestern mention of the term *ushuliyah* which has the same meaning as fundamentalism. Ushuliyah in Arabic it means the basic principles or roots that have meaning positivism, namely the most prominent scholars in contributing sense in studies or those who are expert legal inference, making proposition, *ijtihad* and renewal. Differences in perception and substance use this same term, resulting in the emergence of an error in the communication process. The term fundamentalism is perceived by the world community today is actually a meaning produced by Western nations.

Fundamentalism which refers to the extreme attitudes, black and white, intolerant, not compromise, and everything is associative. Religion used them as a tool for intimidation, persecution to a group of people as opposed to understanding them. Whereas any religion does not teach that. Human values of their religion behind. Religion is built on the integration of rational minds with non-rational thereby creating a reasonable mind (rational), has switched roles that lead to the creation of rationality to berindak anarchic. Religion that serves the spiritual needs of man become serene, peaceful, and secure has turned to hatred, anxiety and fear. Religion has a principle of human values to improve the quality of human humanity has been replaced by the values of the violence and narrow fanaticism.³

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/22/brutal-fight-of-bangladeshs-secular-voices-to-be-heard>, accessed November 17th, 2016; Anonymous, "Secularism And Religion: The Attempted Coup In Turkey", accessed November 18th, 2016, <http://www.europenowjournal.org/2016/10/31/secularism-and-religion-the-attempted-coup-in-turkey/>; E. Fuat Keyman, "Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey", accessed 19th, 2016, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276407075008>,³ Kalmer Marimaa, "The Many Faces of Fanaticism", accessed November 17th, 2016, http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_14_2_kalmer_marimaa.pdf; see David Langness, "How to Get

Understand fundamentalism is necessary for religious life, to demonstrate the existence of human belief, so that religion can be spread so far is nothing but the role of the religious fundamentalists to teach the meaning of human existence living in the world according the order of nature and instill humanitarian norms of human morality. However, bias the religious fundamentalists of the corridors of religious rules, has resulted in the development of understanding of new narrow-minded fundamentalism. This ideology must be straightened to return to the corridors of the nature of true religion.⁴ Understood this way not only will cause damage and arkhis, but also will damage the function and role of religion itself. Value arising from religious morality will be more abandoned his followers.

To fight against narrow-minded religious fundamentalism, it is necessary required *tashfiyah* process (straightening) and *tarbiyah* (education) in accordance with the teachings of their respective religions.⁵ The alignment process is conducted by aligning the human perception of religion to turn to the right corridor. This has resulted in the perception error ideologies fundamentalism that would undermine the universality of religion itself. This rectification as a step to restore the position of understanding of religious fundamentalism to the right path. The position of religious fundamentalism that can deliver together and live side by side in a difference, so that the

Rid of Religious Fanaticism", accessed November 17th, 2016, <http://bahaiteachings.org/how-to-get-rid-of-religious-fanaticism>,

⁴ Mark Lees, "Fascism and Fundamentalism - Two Sides of the Same Coin?", <https://owlcation.com/social-sciences/Fascism-and-Fundamentalism-Two-Sides-of-the-Same-Coin>, accessed March 29th, 2017; see Peter Steinfels, "Fundamentalism: the 20th Century's Last Ideology", November 17th, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/06/us/fundamentalism-the-20th-century-s-last-ideology.html>.

⁵ Adang Darmawan Achmad & Syarifan Nurjan, "Attachment as Character Education in Boarding School", accessed November 16th, 2016, www.atlantispress.com/php/download_paper.php?id=25874210,

position that still gives freedom to disseminate religious teachings with regard to brotherhood or fraternity, harmony with adherents of other religions.

Discussion

1) Modern Islamic Fundamentalism

As the ideology of modern Islamic movement, fundamentalism manifests itself in various forms, and is closely related to the orientation of other ideologies, such as Islamism (neo-fundamentalism) and radicalism. Though originally more shows the character of religious fundamentalism, he should be understood as a form of expression Islam is a political dimension. It is easy to understand because in the development of fundamentalism manifest themselves in the form of activity or political movements, which are often even radical or militant, secular against the regime, or the struggle to build a state system based on the Sharia (Islamic).

Although the term fundamentalism is often used for the purpose of simplification, most scholars try to identify the characteristics of each movement or ideological orientation. They found several common characteristics (common characteristics) as well as the uniqueness (peculiarities) of the various movements of "fundamentalist" Islam. Ayubi in *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, make taxonomic orientation of Islamic movements: reformism or modernism Islam, Salafism, fundamentalism, neo-fundamentalism, Islamism and political Islam (political Islam).⁶ Ayubi state, Islamic reformism or Islamic modernism (represented among others by

⁶ Nazih N. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991), 302; see Dale L. Bishop, "Review on Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World", accessed November 17th, 2016, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Volume 25, Issue 4 November 1993 , 714-716; Nazih N. Ayubi, *Ibid.*, 67-68.

al-Afghani and Abduh) view that Islam is a belief system that is perfect but it is flexible enough to accommodate the development of modern (modernity).⁷

Meanwhile, salafism emphasizes the authentic sources of Islam (al-Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet and the traditions of the early Muslim generation *pasa*, Salaf). Salafism tend scripturalist and traditionalists, as represented by Wahhabiyah, Sanusiyyah, Mahdiyyah, and teachings that come from figures of Rashid Rida and al-early Muslim Brotherhood, as Hasan al-Banna. The *salafi* inclined to doctrinal dogmatism, although sometimes politically flexible. While fundamentalism, almost the same as Salafism, stressed to the original sources of Islam (al-Quran and al-Sunnah), but less sympathetic to fiqh. Fundamentalism holding holistic and comprehensive view of Islam. Islam, according to fundamentalism, is religion, world and state (*din, dunya, dawliah*). This holistic perspective implies the necessity of collective action to realize the totality of Islam into reality.

Neo-Islamic fundamentalism is a break away from the ideology of fundamentalism. Usually neo-fundamentalism have an orientation that is more radical and militant. Neo-fundamentalist movements generally tend to take direct action as a reaction to a particular case. Examples of this model is the movement *Takfir wa al-Hijra in Egypt* and *al-Jihad* in Egypt and some Arab countries. Ayubi said that the orientation of neo-fundamentalism is more patterned politics. Its membership consists primarily of students or recent graduates, from the new urban area of a big city or small towns with rural origins (rural).

⁷ Tauseef Ahmad Parray, "Islamic Modernist and Reformist Thought: A Study of the Contribution of Sir Sayyid and Muhammad Iqbal", accessed 17 November 17th, 2016, http://ebooks.rahnuma.org/religion/Sir_Syed_Ahmed_Khan/islamic_modenist__reformist_thought_through_the_study_of_sir_sayyed_ahmend__muhammad_iqbal.pdf, World Journal of Islamic History and Civilization, 1 (2): 79-93, 2011; see <http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/tvtk/ch26.htm> ,

Neo-fundamentalist in Egypt control of student organizations, and has a relationship with professionals, engineers, and government officials.⁸

This movement as a form of militant Islam (Islamic militancy) is defined as “actual violent behavior committed collectively group against the state or other actors in the name of Islam” as shown in *Jama'at al-Fanniyyah al-'Askariyyah* (technical military academy) and *al-takfir wa al-Hijra*.⁹ In order to Islamism, Ayubi said that the term is usually used to designate the three categories of the Islamic movement: *salafi*, fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist. Islamism is not merely emphasize identity as Muslims, but rather the conscious choice of Islam as a doctrine and ideology. Political Islam (political Islam) is often used to refer to the category of fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalists who tend to emphasize the political nature of Islam and engaged in anti-state activities directly.¹⁰

Fundamentalism is not limited to any particular religion, in fact, he did not just show up among the poor and uneducated. Fundamentalism in any form can appear anywhere when people see the need to fight the secular culture (Godless), even when they have to deviate from the orthodoxy of their tradition to fight it. Based on his observations of religious fundamentalism, especially Christians in America, Huff stated that there are six important fundamentalism characteristics. Sociologically,

⁸ Nazih N. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991), 67, 68-73.

⁹ Charlene Tan, “Islamic Education and Indoctrination: The Case in Indonesia”, accessed November 18th, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281190388_Islamic_Education_and_Indoctrination_The_Case_in_Indonesia; see Martin van Bruinessen, “Muslim Fundamentalism: Something to be Understood or to be Explained Away?”, accessed November 19th, 2016, http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/muslim_fundamentalism.htm.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 67-68.

fundamentalism is often associated with the values that have been outdated or no longer relevant to the changes and development of the times; culturally, fundamentalism showed a tendency to something vulgar and uninterested in things intellectual; psychologically, fundamentalism is characterized by authoritarianism, arrogance, and more inclined to conspiracy theories. Intellectually, fundamentalism is characterized by a lack of historical awareness and inability to engage in critical thinking; and theologically, identified with the fundamentalist literalism, primitivism, legalism and tribalism; whereas politically, fundamentalism associated with reactionary populism.¹¹

In the case of Islam, fundamentalism emerged as a reaction against the consequences posed by modernism and secularism in the political and religious life. Modern-secular civilization became the target of criticism of Islamic fundamentalism, and here fundamentalism has the function of criticism. Rahman and Stoddard state also that Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to the failure of Islamic modernism (classic), because it turns out that the latter is not able to bring the community and the Islamic world to a better life, in accordance with the teachings of Islam.¹²

Islamic fundamentalism bid solutions by returning to the sources of pure and authentic Islam, and reject anything that

¹¹ Slamet Purwadi, "Fundamentalism Revisited : Fundamentalism as a Counter- Culture to Modernity And Its Values", accessed November 19th, 2016, journal.unpar.ac.id/index.php/melintas/article/download/949/933; see Peter A. Huff, "The Challenge of Fundamentalism for Interreligious Dialogue", accessed November 19th, 2016, <http://www.crosscurrents.org/Huff.htm>; or Peter Huff, "The Challenge of Fundamentalism for Interreligious Dialogue," *Cross Current*", accessed November 19th, 2016, http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2096/2000_Spring-Summer/63300895/print.jhtml.

¹² Fazlur Rahman, "Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism." In *Change in the Muslim World*, ed. Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell and Margaret V. Sullivan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 222-223.

comes from the legacy of Western modernism. One of the most important characteristics or traits of Islamic fundamentalism is the literal approach to the sources of Islam (al-Quran and al-Sunnah). Fundamentalist literalism looked at their unwillingness to undertake rational and intellectual interpretation, because indeed they making interpretation-interpreters are narrow and tend to ideologist. One important element of fundamentalism is "scripturalism" the literal belief in an inerrant sacred scripture. Comprehension of fundamentalism sometimes ends there. Murray quotes Antoun that expands on the idea of scripturalism to include an anthropological, societal and cultural perspective. The most important aspect of scripturalism is its emotional and inspirational quality for believers; its relation to the numinous (the mysterious, powerful and awe-inspiring); its serving as a grounding for militant nationalism; its use as proof-texts for guidance in everyday life, and its provision of certainty.¹³

The radicals of today are much closer to the Kharijites a highly politicized form of Islam. They have no compunction with killing Muslims, whether they are in the World Trade Towers or whether there are in Pakistan or Afghanistan, who do not fulfill what they believe is the perfect Islamic code. In this sense they are a throwback to a sect which traditional Islam rejected as un-Islamic. No traditional Muslim, and even a fundamentalist, would say that it is ever legitimate, even in a legitimate war, to kill civilians. The killing of innocents is a sin. But the Islamic radicals have no qualms about violating sacred Islamic law in order to gain power.¹⁴

¹³ Bruce T. Murray, "Making sense of fundamentalists origins and characteristics of fundamentalism", accessed November 20th, 2016, <http://websage.us/religion/antoun.htm>.

¹⁴ David Forte, 2016, "Understanding Islam and the Radicals", accessed November 21st, 2016,

Diferentiation between traditional and modern Islamic fundamentalism. Traditional fundamentalism ('*ulama*) is characterized by the strong role of the clergy or clerical oligarchy (clerical oligarchy) in making the interpretation of Islam.¹⁵ For example: Shia Islam gives great authority to the *ulama* to interpret religious doctrine through their own *tafsir*, and as a result, the intellectual freedom to interpret religious texts to be very narrow and limited. It can be stated that one of the factors that favor the development of fundamentalism (traditional) is the strong authority of scholars, including in matters relating to social and political life. In this case, it appears the similarity between fundamentalism on the one hand and traditionalism on the other.

Fundamentalism is traditionally considered *ulama* and political authorities are two separate entities. While modern fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism is characterized by a strong orientation to political Islam as an ideology. Islam is not understood as a religion that includes the doctrine of ritual, but interpreted as an ideology is confronted circuitry modern ideologies like capitalism, liberalism or socialism. Roy identify Islamism as a more sophisticated form of neo-fundamentalism. Modern Islamic fundamentalism is not led by the *ulama* (except Iran), but by "secular intellectuals" who openly claim to be religious thinkers. They argue that since all knowledge is divine and religious; chemist, engineering, engineer, economic, legal experts are scholars. There is a kind of anti-clericalism among modern Islamic fundamentalism, though fundamentalism in the other face is also characterized by the presence of a clerical oligachy like the former.

<http://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/understanding-islam-and-the-radicals>.

¹⁵ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Trans. Carol Volk, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), 12, 75.

Islamic fundamentalism is a response to the challenges and consequences caused by modernization, and aims to offer the Islamic ideology of the secular-modern world. Islam used as an alternative to modern ideologies, such as liberalism, Marxism and nationalism. Fundamentalism is not a religious movement *per se*, but more of it is a political movement to fight for a state system based on Islamic (*sharia*), it is understandable why many fundamentalist leaders were intellectuals with no systematic education in Islamic studies. In other words, they are not a theologian, but a social thinker and political activist. It is very visible especially in the tradition of Sunni fundamentalism.

Despite the fact that modern Islamic fundamentalism is a minority in the Islamic world, they enjoy and play a significant political role in many Muslim countries. However, their activities are not organized from the center, so it is not uncommon program, strategy and tactics they differ from one country to another. Fundamentalism in this case is characterized by the proliferation of leadership and polycentrism. However, this diversity does not eliminate the existence of some agenda, themes and common policies that are supported by modern Islamic fundamentalists. For the modern Islamic fundamentalist, Islamic state is an ideological state whose domain covers the whole of human life. Islamic state control of social relations, political, economic and cultural, and the state should be based on law or *Sharia* (Islamic ideology). Although fundamentalists believe the nature of their religious, fundamentalism is not an option to be religious, but as a pattern of distorted thinking of the mainstream (mainstream), anti-modernism, anti-rationalism, anti-intellectualism and other characters that have a negative connotation. Fundamentalism in politics is seen as a threat to democracy, liberalism and pluralism.

2) Political-Fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism is also often used to refer to political Islam. This is inseparable from some fundamentalist agenda in politics. The political nature of Islamic fundamentalism is manifested in the religious symbols they use in the context of political or power struggles, such as the Islamic state, the Islamic government and the formalization of sharia within the state. One fundamentalist Islamic doctrine is that there is no separation of religion from politics. Olivier Roy¹⁶ calls this notion as Islamic political imagination. According to Roy, this fundamentalism appears in the Ikhwân al-Muslimîn in Egypt founded by Hasan al-Bannâ, and Jamâ'at-i Islâmî in Indo-Pakistan founded by Abû al-A'lâ al-Mawdûdî. Both define Islam as a political system or ideology vis-à-vis the great ideologies of the 20th century.

The contemporary expression of Islamic fundamentalism is Hizb al-Tahrîr al-Islâmî.¹⁷ From the beginning, this movement competed with Ikhwân al-Muslimîn. This movement is very unique because it openly declares itself as a political party that makes Islam an ideology and moves in the field of politics. It aims to rebuild the Islamic caliphate as a single system, and not fragmented into the nation-state. Khilafah is based on *sharia*, not on secular democracy. This movement is classified as radical and revolutionary, because it uses *jihad* strategy. According to this movement, all countries in the world today do not apply Islam (*sharia*), because it is *dâr al-kufr*, eventhough the population majority is Muslim. He stressed that the restoration of the khilafah is the task of all Muslims in the world through political agitation and caliphath revolution.¹⁸

¹⁶ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*. Trans. Carol Volk, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), 75.

¹⁷ Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (London & New York: Routledge, 1991), 96-97.

¹⁸ Dale F. Eickelman & James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 139.

However, the ideals of various political Islam groups have failed to change the political landscape of the Middle East and some other regions. Political Islam does not gain power, while the old regimes are still in power. The power of the West and America is increasingly plugged the hegemony (political, economic, cultural) in the region. Political Islam also does not always succeed in presenting the values contained in the ideals of fundamentalism in the application of religious laws (*sharia*) in politics. Fundamentalist Islam in some places, such as in Algeria, Sudan or Turkey, only has given to developing significant legal, political and economic changes. In this case, fundamentalism does emphasize the total application of *sharia*, but often does not care about the nature of the political system. In reality, fundamentalism is not a monolithic reality, but it contains variant variants, and even experienced significant shifts. In addition to the variants of traditional fundamentalism and modern fundamentalism, there can be witnessed a shift to what is called neo-fundamentalism.

Fundamentalists were initially interested in moving at the political level of the country. They offer formulas and political structures of state derived from the Qur'an and al-Sunnah. In fact, to realize these ideals fundamentalists also form parties within the framework of modern democracy as well as with the way of revolution. However, when they experience political failure, the goal of the fundamentalist struggle is no longer at the state level, but shifts to individuals and society. Neo-fundamentalism is more focused on filling daily life with morality and *sharia* (legalism). Therefore, state discourse is replaced by community discourse, and the chosen strategy includes one of the following: infiltrating into official political life, re-investment in the social field, and morally, or

economically and forming small groups, both ultra orthodox groups or terrorist groups.¹⁹

The orientation and strategy of the neo-fundamentalist group is to control society through social action. Far from being revolutionary, neo-fundamentalists now enter civil society and political classes. Although the character of the revolution is lost, the symbols of Islam permeate society and Islamic political discourse. The retreat of Islamic fundamentalists from politics is accompanied by the rise of Islam as a social and moral phenomenon. Neo-fundamentalism seeks to re-islamize society at the grassroot level, and no longer through the state. This is consistent with what fundamentalists believe: if the Islamic society is based on the merits of its members, then their individuals and practices must be renewed. The fundamentalists of this model direct their struggle on the birth of Islamic society and Islamic space.

However, this shift is seen as a symbol of the failure of Islamic fundamentalism in politics resulting in a significant change in the weight of thought and movement. Roy called this phenomenon as *lumpenization*, which gave birth to lumpen intelligents. The intellectual qualities of fundamentalists have declined, political activism has also declined. Neo-fundamentalists place more emphasis on autonomous islamized space, and more emphasize the good intentions of the individual, without the need to intricately engage in political struggle. In Indonesia, this new fundamentalism phenomenon appears in the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) or Laskar Jihad and similar movements. Not infrequently the fundamentalism of this model also uses the ways that lead to violence.

Islamists assume that society will be islamised only through social and political action. The Islamist movement must plunge into the political field. Islamists claim that politics is

¹⁹ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*. Trans. Carol Volk, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), 90-93.

pursued by the principle that Islam is a global system of thought. Islamists are not led by 'ulama (except in Iran), but by secular intellectuals who claim to be religious thinkers. Islamists adopt the classical vision of Islam as a universal and complete system, so it does not have to be modernized, and on the contrary modern life must be Islamized. The Islamist movement sees itself as a socio-political movement, built on the basis of Islam that is understood more as a political ideology. Therefore they do not confront themselves with other religions, but rather with modern ideologies such as Marxism, capitalism, and liberalism.

3) Indonesian Fundamentalism

The ideological orientation mapping of Islamic movements within the Indonesian context requires deep observation and identification. However, following the Olivier Roy or Nazih Ayubi approach, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia has basic characteristics that are not much different from Middle Eastern counterpart, for example, despite the uniqueness and paradoxes. Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia can be divided into two: traditional and modern. Traditional fundamentalism is represented by groups emphasizing literal and scriptural approaches to Islamic sources, such as Persatuan Islam (Persis), and in the context of the latest Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) through its *fatwas*.²⁰

Meanwhile, modern fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism in politics is represented for example by Islamic political parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), and other Islamic parties that aspire to establish an Islamic state on the basis of Shari'ah and the ideology of Islam. Those who fight for the Jakarta Charter as the basis of the state are included in the group of fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism. They do not question the nature of the

²⁰ See *Kompas* (30 July 2005), 1: 4-5; *Tempo* (21 August 2005): 156-157.

nation-state with its secular democracy. However, substantially there is a paradox between their acceptance of the secular political system and their struggle to apply the Islamic Shari'a. Thus, there is a compromising or even pragmatic attitude among these fundamentalist Islamic groups, no longer a political tactic.

Another Islamic fundamentalism is the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which fought for the establishment of a universal caliphate and Islamic Shari'a as its foundation. This group does not recognize the national state. Their struggle is not to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, like existing Islamic political parties, but to build a trans-national Islamic state under the sole leadership of the Islamic caliphate. Almost similar to HTI namely *Jama'ah Islamiyyah* movement which is considered aimed to establish a regional state (Southeast Asia) under the leadership of an emir. Correspondingly, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) represents the model of this movement. Both HTI and MMI have similarities in their political orientation and equally reject the secular regime, democracy and Western hegemony (alike USA).²¹ Roy also stated that they are a group of political Islam (political Islam) that has never managed to change the political landscape of Indonesia.

Meanwhile, another expression of Islamic undamentalism is the orientation of Islamic radicalism represented for example by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) movement, and Lasykar Jihad. The orientation of Islamic radicalism is more on the application of sharia at the community level, not at the state level. Following Roy's earlier explanation, this orientation reflects a shift in the fundamentalists' struggle from Islamic state (sharia state formalization at the state level) to Islamic (*Shari'ah*-level implementation) of society. They struggle not to realize the Islamic state (at least for the short term), but rather on the application of shari'a at the family and society level (Islamized

²¹ See Riza Sihbudi, et.al. *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005).

space). However, in realizing the goal of Islamization of the people, safeguarding Islamic morality, they tend to use violent means or approaches.

The study tends to focus on the roots of the fundamentalism movement network that is in the name of Muslims from the side of the teaching of the teachings of which schools are allegedly contributing to the birth of the national terrorist movement. The phenomenon of fundamentalism among Muslims is often juxtaposed with religious ideology. The religious ideology of Islam that is often considered to be the inspiration of the fundamentalist movement is the understanding of wahhabi, even if carefully examined radical movements among religions is a social phenomenon and not a religious phenomenon.

This means that the influence of any kind of religious teaching is only one factor of the many factors of radicalization of social movements. This study does not focus on the phenomenon of radical Islamic movements, but focuses on the phenomenon of transformation of *salafi* values, often identified as the inspiration of the radical movement. The Asian regional report released by the International Crisis Group (hereinafter referred to as ICG) on 13 September 2004 states that in Indonesia there are a number of educational institutions that join the *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah* Communication Forum.²²

A number of these boarding schools are trying to teach salafi teachings to the students and their students with the aims: (1) To train future teachers in Islamic and Arabic languages in the future will be placed in a number of Islamic schools and boarding schools; (2) To prepare a number of preachers who will disseminate *salafism* in society on a larger scale; (3) To practice the teachings of Islam avoided the forms of *bid'ah*, superstition

²² ICG, *Indonesian Background: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, Asia Report No. 83, September, 13th, 2004.

and *khurafat*; (4) To implement the *dauroh* program and some other forms of training.

Two large groups of Salafist followers in Indonesia: first the Surury group with its central figure Yusuf Utsman Baisa argues that for Islamic *da'wah* to be built on three main pillars. Organizational capabilities such as those exemplified by the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement, the Jama'ah Tabligh policy and religious teachings ever taught by salaf figures. Whereas *da'wah* aims to disseminate and teach the Islamic religious knowledge among Muslims.

While the second group is a puritan group with its central figure Ja'far Umar Thalib who assumes that the imposition of Islam to a certain group (*hizbiyyah*) as done by the Sururi group (which is inspired by the thought of Muhammad Surur, a former member of the muslim brotherhood) is not justified. Even in his view *khuruj* (out of comfort zone in faith reason) practice that is required for members *tabligh jama'ah* is one form of *bid'ah* practices that are not found roots in the teachings of Islam. In addition to the two groups that differ in their theological concept, there are two groups in the salafi followers when dealing with others.

Both groups are *salafi non-Jihadi* and *salafi Jihadi*. They differ in four things. First, about the allowed to rebel against the muslim government. The first group does not allow while, the second allows it. Both relate to the urgency of the organization to support their cause. For the second problem, the first group does not require a structured organization, while the second group requires it. The third difference between the two groups lies in the concept of *jihad*. The first group tends to interpret *jihad* with a broader and less narrowing sense in the sense of war, while the other groups mean Jihad just war. The fourth point of difference is the tactics and methods of struggle associated with *Jihad*.

Theoretical search for the rise of fundamentalist movements, some hypotheses always refer to the three main strands in approaching the social phenomenon. The first is the

Weberian school that believes that a social movement has a structure on the commitment held by a group of members of society to a belief system from which it can be defined the purpose of movement, the pattern of social behavior, the legitimacy of a power. The second school was inspired by Karl Marx's ideas. Max argues that the social class emerges from a position held by a society in a production system, then a change occurs as a result of a process of shifting in the organization of production.

Therefore, shared goals and beliefs are derived from mutual interests and mediated through internal structures and classroom relationships. A social movement for the followers of this school of thought emerges and begins with a struggle for the interests and awareness of a common identity. The third school in the study of social movements was inspired by the thought of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim. Social integration derives from mutual consciousness, and the uncertainties that lead to anomalous conditions, individual disorientation and conflict that occur. Social change on the one hand creates improvement, but on the other hand results in disintegration among members of society. The disintegration like this would mean happened more egocentric behavior and norm violation, and greater de-legitimation with distrust of public authority.²³

Salafism in this article was assumed as a collective consciousness that is systematically transformed to its members through a network of boarding schools. The collective consciousness is subsequently sublimated as public knowledge and ultimately affects religious behavior and becomes a social

²³ Seth D. Kaplan, 2017, "A System Approach to Social Disintegration", accessed on April 15th, 2017, <https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/a-systems-approach-to-social-disintegration>.

identity.²⁴ In the perspective of the formation of knowledge (muslim *salafi*) there are three issues that become the major focus in this study. The *first* is the source of science that leads to a curriculum taught in some boarding schools have salafi's doctrines. The *second* is the interaction between group members who have the same social identity, and in this context is the process of transforming salafi ideology in the form of both formal and informal teaching patterns as well as the relationship between the network of *salafi pesantren* (Islamic boarding school). The third is the inner group's perception of the outer group.²⁵ These three issues are the focus of this attention to reveal the portrait of salafi Islam in Indonesia.

4) Hermeneutical Context²⁶ on The Sacred Texts

Hermeneutics in principle is a knowledge or methodological theory of interpretation that aims to explain the text from its characteristics, both objectively (the grammatical meaning of words and various historical variations) and subjective (intent of author).²⁷ The texts that was approached

²⁴ We can read on Peter Beger & Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991); E. Doyle McCarthy, *Knowledge as Culture: The New Sociology of Knowledge*, (London and New York: Roudledge, 1996).

²⁵ Young Yun Kim, *Communication and Cross Cultural Adaptation: an Integrative Theory*, (Clevedon: Phi, Multilingual Matters, Ltd.,1995).

²⁶ See Raimond Panikkar, 2017, "Diatopical hermeneutics", accessed on April 14th, 2017, <http://www.raimon-panikkar.org/english/gloss-diatopic.html>. He state that: "Diatopical hermeneutics stands for the thematic consideration of understanding the other without assuming that the other has the same basic self-understanding. The ultimate human horizon, and not only differing contexts, is at stake here. *Diatopical* hermeneutics is a hermeneutic that goes beyond traditional *morphological* hermeneutics and diachronical hermeneutics, as much as it takes as its point of departure the awareness that the "topoi", locations within distinct cultures, cannot be understood with the tools of understanding from only one tradition or culture.

²⁷ Hermeneutics at the root word "hermeneuein" which means "to interpret" (English), "hermeneutics", and Greek, "hermeneutikos" (interpretation) as

primarily concerned with authoritative writings, namely sacred scriptures. The imposition of hermeneutics is so comparable the meaning of exegesis or *tafsîr* in Islamic notion.²⁸

The sacred texts in the printed hermeneutical framework (*mushhaf al-Qur'an*, for example) become disembodied and de-contextualized as soon to be separated from their original context.²⁹ Written texts by themselves indicate the high degree of de-contextualization, especially since the written texts are detached from their authors.³⁰ The decontextualization of the text

term, hermeneutics is complete as a process of changing something or situation of ignorance to "understand. See, Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 3. Hermeneutics in classical use, refers to the interpretation of texts, especially on religious sacred texts. In philosophical context, it combines with structuralism within the framework of the creation of methods of interpreting texts that place philosophy in the midst of culture. Hermeneutics is divided in three ways, namely as method, philosophy, and as criticism. The first one is category focuses on the subject as a methodology for the human sciences (*geistesswissenschaften*); the second one is category emphasizes the ontological status of 'understanding' itself; while the latter category, third, directs its sweeping to the cause of distortion in the understanding and communications that take place on a daily basis. See Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 1.

²⁸ See Kurt F. Leidecker, "Hermeneutics," in Dagobert D. Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1976), 126.


²⁹ Ontological aspect of the notion of native interpretation rests on the hermeneutic theorist Hans Georg Gadamer. Gadamer calls his hermeneutic idea more as an ontological rather than methodological treatise. See Richard King, *Agama, Orientalisme, dan Poskolonialisme*, trans.: Agung Prihantoro (Jogjakarta: Qalam, 2001), 138. In Gadamer 's notion, the hermeneutic situation is an ontological starting point of all human behavior and thought that extends the traditional conception of hermeneutics as interpretation of a biblical methodology or a general methodology of philological and textual analysis. See Palmer, *Ibid.*, 33, 42.

³⁰ See Walter Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World* (London: Methuen, 1982), 103.

(also called 'intertextuality'), significantly gives a much more universal power to the written word.

The ideas expressed in written texts are no longer strongly bound to the context of their authors, since the meaning that the reader or interpreter finds in the text is essentially the product or interpretation of the textual interpreter itself. Text, is essentially autonomous. There is no dialectic between the text and the author or between the author and the interpreter via the text, except between the text and the interpreter. Enriching dialogue is only possible between the text and the interpreter so that the text can respond as far as if, hermeneutically, the interpreter is open to the text response. The emerging meaning is the result of negotiation between the interpreter and the text and not necessarily found in the text itself. Understanding meaning is an event between the text and the interpreter that determines each other. All activities of interpretation of the text are creative.

The Author-Text-Interpretation Relation Pattern



The important role of the horizon (tradition, prejudice, and historical conditioning) of interpreters in every interpretive process enables the notion of local interpretation to be ontologically valid. On the first level, it allows for the interchange of Islam from its particular Arabic taste (*juz'iyât*) to the universal dimension (*kulliyât*; moral spirit) of it and then to

grapple it with non-Arab cultural reality for the establishment of what Islam calls 'local flavor'.

A local style of commentary begins with an awareness of the nature of the interpreter's existence in which the interpreter's horizon is necessarily involved in every act of interpretation. How important the involvement of the horizon in interpreting it is increasingly meeting its significance and actual form of ethno-hermeneutics.³¹ Without pretending to seek a precedent outside the tradition of the Islamic world interpretation, ethno-hermeneutics tangling here is prioritized as a starting point for the initial quest and confirmation of the epistemological basis of local style *tafsir* ideas.

Ethno-hermeneutics has the main characteristic that the entire application of hermeneutical methods should be oriented to the receptor, the recipient. This shift of orientation departs from a postulate that there is not a single truly universal method

³¹ As a pattern of interpretation, the emergence of ethno-hermeneutic begins with anxiety while the restless scholar (evangelist) after seeing the reality of cultural diversity in different parts of the world breaks the centuries-old establishment of the classical hermeneutical paradigm and methodology of the interpretation of the gospel. They realized not only to review the methodological adequacy of the general hermeneutical methods, but also to arouse the necessity of a viable and compatible hermeneutic method in the situation of a multicultural society. In the midst of this deadlock, ethno-hermeneutics presents itself as a paradigmatic pattern of interpretation in a cross-cultural context in which one of its agenda formulates culturally appropriate dynamic hermeneutic methods. In particular, the interpreter's horizon awakened from the consciousness of tradition and appreciation of his own historical is indeed a kind of entry-point to ethno-hermeneutics. For an introductory exposure to ethno-hermeneutics and its strategic value see the reflective interpretation from Larry W. Caldwell, "Towards the New Discipline of Ethnohermeneutics: Questioning the Relevancy of Western Hermeneutical Methods in the Asian Context," in *Journal of Asian Mission*, Vol. 1, Nr. 1 (March 1999): 21-43; and, "A Response to the Responses of Tappeiner and Whelchel to Ethnohermeneutics," in *Journal of Asian Mission*, Vol. 2, Nr. 1 (March 2000): 135-45.

of interpretation which applies equally to all cultural contexts in which textual messages are to be earthed, so that the interpretation of texts in a cross-cultural context, within the framework of ethno-hermeneutics, as far as possible to apply dynamic hermeneutical methods that have functioned in the culture concerned. The aim is to interpret the teaching texts in the most comprehensible ways so as to produce the most adaptable interpretive products of the receptor culture.

This way intends to interpret the word of God in the most comprehensible ways from within the *weltanschauung* recipient society (including the word of God concerning *jihad*). This led to the search for a recipient oriented methodical pattern of interpretation with distinct cultural backgrounds to be a major commitment of ethno-hermeneutics. Here it seems implicitly necessary to contextualize the text in the space and time of the receptor.³² In-depth internal contextualization is not merely linked to a culturally appropriate end-product of interpretation, but also by means of achieving the final product that is culturally appropriate as well.³³

Good contextualization is a comprehensive package; he is sensitive to all aspects of a culture, including hermeneutical methods that may emerge from the culture. Starting from the ontological status, the orientation pattern, and the contextualization that ethnohermenutut offered as the basis of this initial idea of local interpretation of the epistemological framework. From ontological repetition, the initial impression arising from local commentary may be 'worrying' about. To be honest with such a choice, and where the local interpretive idea is directed can invite problems. In this connection, Abu-Zayd's hermeneutical hesitancy is understandable.

³² The basic premise underlying the whole ethno-hermeneutic discipline is that God works in each culture by calling on the individuals within each culture of himself.

³³ *Ibid.*, 136-137.

Zayd stated that, contemporary philosophical hermeneutic puts too much emphasis on the role of the interpreter in understanding, determining the significance and meaning of the text until often the existence of texts is sacrificed in the interest of the effectiveness of interpretation. Past presuppositions lead to the fact that the interpretive activity only draws the text to the interpreter's horizon. Without diminishing Gadamer's ontological spirit of hermeneutics while still paying attention to Abu-Zayd's wariness, the idea of a local interpretation builds its epistemological reasoning in a circular hermeneutic motion.³⁴

The whole process is hacked by departing from the reality experienced, faced, and then on the fundamental structure. How the outcome of the formulation of reality will depend largely on the rich-depth or not how to experience. This circular motion at least affirms the engagement or closeness of the interpreter with the context of reality as a condition of necessity.

Furthermore, the formulation of the formula is confronted or discussed with the sacred texts (*Qur'an, hadith*) which are housed as superstructures. Of course, this dialogue at the same time ignore the world of text, the world of text (context of the existence of the text). This dialogue either directly or indirectly

³⁴ See Abu-Zayd, *Tekstualitas Al-Qur'an: Kritik terhadap Ulumul Qur'an*, trans.: Khoiron Nahdliyyin (Jogjakarta: LKiS, 2002), xvi. This disclosure is important in the context of its distinction to the meaning of *tafsîr* and *ta'wîl*. Tafsir is better understood in the *mufasssir* and textual texts of the interpretation process (*bayânî*), while *ta'wîl* is firmly directed at the meaning of the interpretation of texts either based on rations such as *Mu'tazila (Burhânî)* or on the intuitions speculative (*irfânî*) perpetrated by the Sufis. See Farid Esack, *Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997), 82-86; Mohammed Arkoun. *Nalar Islami dan Nalar Modern: Berbagai Tantangan dan Jalan Baru*. Trans: Rahayu S. Hidayat (Jakarta: INIS, 1994), 15-29, 43-124; and John Goldingay, "The Hermeneutics of Liberation Theology" in *Horizon in Biblical Theology*, 11 (1989), 133-61.

applies the process of categorical mapping of the text with respect to the facts that have been formulated. From here the hermeneutic circular movement is passed on to the continuation of interpretation (*tafsir, ta'wîl*) on texts mapped in accordance with the contemporary context of the formulated reality.

In the second stage, the interpretation of related texts is done by a progressive regressive-hermeneutical procedure. The regressive movement confirms a continuous reversal into the past. Not projecting current needs and demands based on sacred texts, but to discover the mechanisms and historical factors that underlie the birth of texts and give them functions. In this case the process of textual appearance (revelation of the *Quran*) in the context of society is studied and its meaning in the context of the past is typically understood. However, the process of understanding is done in contemporary personal and social contexts, ie the context of reality that has been formulated.

Sacred texts are an integral part of Muslim identity and are active in their ideological system, so they must work again to regain their contemporary and contextual meaning. The progressive regression of the text and its socio-historical context and the context of muslims to the contexts of present-day reality is seen as the need to gain meaning and meaning appropriate to contemporary demands. the social reality of the interpreter (*umma*) itself. In projecting textual interpretations of reality will give birth to new ways to understand and respond to a creativity-responsive reality.

This signifies that the circular motion does not recognize the finality, continuing the endless enrichment of every hermeneutical process. Finally, the overall hermeneutic movement has two dimensions: objective (textual) and subjective (reality of formulated reality). Progressive-regressive procedure is basically the application of textual and contextual analysis of text and context at the same time. The application of this model of analysis is a concrete form of progressive procedure, so it is an integral part of the hermeneutical circular process. The process of

analysis refers to an awareness of the sacred texts (revelation: the *Quran* or *hadith*) and its attachment to the context (history, part of the text world).³⁵

The relationship between the two signifies the presence or absence of a historical dialectical relationship directly related to the presence of the text, which is accommodated; (which in the *'ulum al-Qur'ân* tradition is more or less arbitrary with *asbâb al-nuzûl*). Then theorizing and based on the text and its historical context is to construct a general theoretical framework. Theoretical motivation of both is the first step of analysis. At this stage the textual analysis is done critically. Furthermore, the second step, facing the theoretical framework that has been built with social theory.

This is the beginning of the contextual analysis process. Existing social theories are sorted and chosen to be used to see and understand the (contemporary) social reality, in which the process of contextualisation will take place. After that, the third step, in order to understand critically the social reality, the use of social theory is directed at the inclusion of a hypothesis. Through the paradigmatic pattern of such a commentary, the notion of local interpretation not only focuses its commitment to the passion of localizing the symbolic Islamic teachings which are bound by the historical time-space of Arabia at that time, such as the recitation of the *Qur'an*, the veil, or other similar superficial symbols.³⁶

³⁵ A apart analysis from Louay Safi, *The Foundation of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in Islamic and Western Methods of Inquiry* (Selangor Darul Ehsan: International Islamic University Press, 1996), 196.

³⁶ In the tradition of *'ulum al-Qur'ân* this issue becomes controversial. He is not only related to the debate about "the decline of the *Qur'an* with seven letters", but also about the way *shahîh* chanting the *Qur'an* which refers to *qirâ'ât al-sab'ah*. The exposure of this fact merely shows how in terms of reciting *Qur'anic* passages and there are many different ways, each of which is bound

Furthermore, it redirects the excessive slogan (*shâlih li kulli zamân wa makân*), to be realistic and humane by way of mapping as well as redefining, reformulating, reforming, reconstructing, or even deconstructing some particular Islamic teachings that due to the changing age context no longer applicable, such as the question of the discriminatory inheritance, the testimony and leadership of women, slavery, non-muslim discrimination, and so on. The idea of local interpretation is basically not meant to carry a particular method.

It is not primarily intended as a particular methodical-technical-practical guide to the interpretation of texts, but rather as a paradigmatic offering, a paradigm of readings which in many ways seeks to shift the classical, textually oriented paradigm of shifting paradigm. That is, technical interpretation can be any model; *mawdlu'î*, *tahlîlî* or *tajzi'î*, or encyclopaedic style, with paradigmatic notes it necessitates contextualization so that the text must ultimately be devoted to the context of reality through progressive regressive motion, so interpretation results must be projected on the socio-cultural interests of the receptor.

Thus, there is a suspicion of overindiction, no textual deification, no disclaimer or let alone the intellectual horizon awakening awakened from local wisdom. The developed paradigm puts people (autonomous with their own unique cultural horizon) as the center. As interpreters or readers, they are autonomous meanings to the context, while the text serves in the defined context. Therefore, there can be no monopoly of truth, because the meaning of the text is too rich to be reduced to one truth and monopolized by a dominant (Arabic) culture; Allah almighty is too great to be represented by only one interpretation.

Conclusion

by the historical conditions and the different places and cultures of the priests who initiated it.

The educational process is needed as a form of coaching efforts and implant religious values properly so as not to return to narrow fundamentalism. In addition to introducing the values and principles of religion, this educational process is also a step to form a cadre of human religion and has a high spiritualism. Education is done to optimize human quality according to human nature, and later will be applied into complex society life. In the process of alignment and education it is necessary to involve leaders and religious leaders as the main actors in spreading religion correctly and straightening fundamentalism. While the government together with the community impose by giving freedom of every religious people to follow the religion according to their respective beliefs and provide an opportunity to run the worship. Thus it is expected that religious fundamentalism that leads to acts of anarchy and terror can be straightened and justified against fundamentalist religious fundamentalism because it is still observing the corridors of religious principles. Fundamentalist understanding is based on a universal human spirit and human dignity. No religion teaches evil and enmity. Often, people make misinterpretations or misunderstandings.

References

- Achmad, Adang Darmawan & Nurjan, Syarifan. "Attachment as Character Education in Boarding School", November 16th, 2016, www.atlantispress.com/php/download_paper.php?id=25874210
- Ahmad Azhar Basyir. "Reaktualisasi, Pendekatan Sosiologis Tidak Selalu Relevan." dalam *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam*. ed. Iqbal AS. Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988, 103-116.
- Ahmad, Baso. "Pengantar Penerjemah: Posmodernisme sebagai Kritik Islam - Kontribusi Metodologis 'Kritik Nalar'

- Muhammad Abed al-Jabiri." dalam Muhammad Abed al-Jabiri. *Post-tradisionalisme Islam*. trans.: Ahmad Baso. Jogjakarta: LKiS, 2000, ix-liv.
- Anonymous, November 17th, 2016,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/22/brutal-fight-of-bangladeshs-secular-voices-to-be-heard>
- Anonymous. "Secularism And Religion: The Attempted Coup In Turkey", November 18th, 2016,
<http://www.europenowjournal.org/2016/10/31/secularism-and-religion-the-attempted-coup-in-turkey/>
- Arkoun, Mohammed. *Nalar Islami dan Nalar Modern: Berbagai Tantangan dan Jalan Baru*. ab. Rahayu S. Hidayat. Jakarta: INIS, 1994.
- Arkoun, Mohammed. *Tekstualitas Al-Qur'an: Kritik terhadap Uloomul Qur'an*. trans.: Khoiron Nahdliyyin. Jogjakarta: LKiS, 2002.
- Armstrong, Karen. *Berperang Demi Tuhan: Fundamentalisme dalam Islam, Kristen, dan Yahudi*. ab. Satrio Wahono, et. al. Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2001.
- Ayubi, Nazih. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Beger, Peter, dan Luckmann, Thomas. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Binder, Leonard. *Islamic Liberalism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
- Bishop, Dale L. "Review on Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World", November 17th, 2016, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Volume 25, Issue 4 November (1993): 714-716.
- Burke, Edmund III, dan Lapidus, Ira M. (eds.) *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Caldwell, Larry W. "Towards the New Discipline of Ethnohermeneutics: Questioning the Relevancy of

- Western Hermeneutical Methods in the Asian Context.”
Journal of Asian Mission. Vol. 1, Nr. 1 (March 1999): 21-43.
- Choueiri, Youssef M. *Islamic Fundamentalism*. Boston, Massachussets: Twayne Publishers, 1990.
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair. “Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences.” Dalam *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter. 3-19. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988.
- Eickelman, Dale F. dan James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Esack, Farid. *Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression*. Oxford: Oneworld, 1997.
- Gadamer, Hans Georg. *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1975.
- Huff, Peter. “The Challenge of Fundamentalism for Interreligious Dialogue,” *Cross Current* (Spring-Summer, 2002).
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2096/2000_Spring-Summer/63300895/print.jhtml
- ICG, *Indonesian Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004.
- Jainuri, Achmad. *Orientasi Ideologi Gerakan Islam*. Surabaya: LPAM, 2004.
- Josef Bleichert, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- Kaplan, Seth D. “A System Approach to Social Disintegration”, April 15th, 2017,
<https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/a-systems-approach-to-social-disintegration>.
- Keyman, E. Fuat. “Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey”, November 19th, 2016,

- <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276407075008>
- Khan, Ahmed. "Islamic modernist reformist thought through the study of sir sayyed ahmed muhammad iqbal", November 17th, 2016, http://ebooks.rahnuma.org/religion/Sir_Syed_Ahmed_Khan/islamic_modenist__reformist_thought_through_the_study_of_sir_sayyed_ahmend__muhammad_iqbal.pdf.
- Kim, Young Yun. *Communication and Cross Cultural Adaptation: an Integrative Theory*. Clevedon, Phi, Multilingual Matters, Ltd., 1995.
- King, Richard. *Agama, Orientalisme, dan Poskolonialisme*. ab. Agung Prihantoro. Jogjakarta: Qalam, 2001.
- Lee, Robert D. *Mencari Islam Autentik: Dari Nalar Puitis Iqbal Hingga Nalar Kritis Arkoun*. ab. Ahmad Baiquni. Bandung: Mizan, 2000.
- Leidecker, Kurt F. "Hermeneutics," dalam Dagobert D. Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1976.
- Lees, Mark. "Fascism and Fundamentalism - Two Sides of the Same Coin?", March 29th, 2017, <https://owlcation.com/social-sciences/Fascism-and-Fundamentalism-Two-Sides-of-the-Same-Coin>
- Madjid, Nurcholish. "Kata Sambutan: Universalisme Agama dan Kenisbian Peradaban" in M. Dawam Rahardjo. *Ensiklopedi Al-Qur'an: Tafsir Sosial Berdasarkan Konsep-konsep Kunci*. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996. xxvii-xxxiii.
- Mamouri, Ali . "The Roots of Radicalism in Political Islam", November 14th, 2016. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/radicalism-political-islam-roots-sunni-shiite-fundamentalist.html>.
- Marimaa, Kalmer. "The Many Faces of Fanaticism", November 17th, 2016, http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_14_2_kalmer_marimaa.pdf

- Palmer, Richard E. *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969).
- Rahman, Fazlur. "Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism." Dalam *Change in the Muslim World*, ed. Philip H Stoddard, David C. Cuthell and Margaret V. Sullivan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981).
- Roy, Olivier. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Trans. Carol Volk. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Safi, Louay. *The Foundation of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in Islamic and Western Methods of Inquiry*. Selangor Darul Ehsan: International Islamic University Press, 1996.
- Shepard, William. "Fundamentalism Christian and Islamic," *Religion* 17 (1987): 355-378.
- Shepard, William. "What is 'Islamic Fundamentalism'?" *Studies in Religion* 17, 1 (1988): 5-25.
- Sihbudi, Riza, et.al. *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*. Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. Enlarged Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985.
- Steinfels, Peter. "Fundamentalism: the 20th Century's Last Ideology", November 17th, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/06/us/fundamentalism-the-20th-century-s-last-ideology.html>
- Voll, John Obert. "Relations Among Islamist Groups," in *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?*. Ed. John L. Esposito. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997, 231-247.
- Voll, John Obert. *Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World*. Second Edition. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994.

Zuckerman, Phil. "Secularism, Religion, and Racism: Who is more likely to be racist, the strongly religious or the strongly secular?", November 17th, 2016, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-secular-life/201408/secularism-religion-and-racism>.